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Export Control Proliferation:
The Effects of United States Governmental
Export Control Regulations on Small
Businesses—Requisite Market Share Loss;
A Remodeling Approach
Jared A. Borocz-Cohen *
Made in the USA. This phrase, stamped on the bottom of many
domestic items, is becoming increasingly difficult to find abroad.
The United States government, of course, regulates almost every
good manufactured in America. The obvious federal regulations
encompass topics such as, but not limited to, consumer safety,
durability, and warranty. However, perhaps the most important
of these regulations are those aimed at national security.
Federal regulations concerning national security is the junction
at which export controls come into play. The central goal of
export controls in the United States, and globally, is to promote
security. The main issue this raises for businesses–especially
smaller manufacturing businesses–is that, in the process of
compliance with national security protocols, business
productivity may be adversely affected.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The primary task of this Comment is to give an overview of the
export control regime that affects most small businesses in the exporting
industry. This Comment will highlight some of the most important
challenges that small businesses are facing when striving to export those
goods deemed “dual-use.” The term dual-use encompasses goods that
can be used both for civilian and weapons purposes. While this may
sound less than sinister for most small business, when delving deeper
into the degree of federal regulation employed, the effects thereof can be
widespread. Many items that most Americans use every day–such as
computers, navigation devices, smartphones, and gaming consoles–are
actually regulated by stringent export controls. The task for small
businesses that produce items such as microchips, radio devices,
computers, and navigation equipment, is one of navigation and expertise.

II.

EXPORT CONTROLS IN GENERAL

Whether a shipment requires an export license depends on a
multitude of factors: what is the actual item being shipped, where it is
going, who is the end-user, and for what purposes will the end-user be
utilizing the shipment. 1 The control lists, which will be discussed in the
1

U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, KNOW
EXPORTING LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 2.

THE

FACTS BEFORE YOU SHIP: A GUIDE

TO
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proceeding section of this Comment, only encompass the items
controlled. The item may, however, be controlled to certain destinations
and not others. 2 An item is considered a “controlled” good when it
requires a license to export from the United States to a foreign country. 3
Items shipped to many embargoed countries are controlled, but those
same items may be shipped without a license to a range of other, nonembargoed countries. 4 For example, a corporation is required to apply
for an export license from the Department of Commerce for goods
deemed “EAR99” being shipped to embargoed countries, 5 such as Iran, 6
Cuba 7 and Syria. 8 “EAR99 items generally consist of low-technology 9
consumer goods” 10 that would not normally require a shipping license. 11
Additionally, any materials on the ITAR control list are prohibited from
being shipped to multiple other restricted states around the world.12
Various other items most likely require an export license as well, even
for EAR99 goods, 13 as these countries are embargoed countries.
In order to know if an item is controlled, each exporter must know
the item’s Export Control Classification Number (ECCN). 14 This

2

Id. at 2-3.
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCE DEPARTMENT EXPORT
CONTROLS 2.
4
Id.
5
See Commerce Control List, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl (last visited
Oct. 1, 2014).
6
31 C.F.R. Part 560.
7
31 C.F.R. part 515.
8
31 C.F.R. part 542; see also Jeffery A. Van Detta, Politics and Legal Regulation in
the International Business Environment: An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in Israel, 21
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 92 (2013).
9
Low-technology consumer goods consist of general household goods, such as
pencils, pens, jewelry, and pharmaceuticals.
10
Kimberly Orr & Betty Lee, Demystifying Department of Commerce Export Controls
for the Biosafety Professional 14 Applied Biosafety 70 (2009).
11
Id.
12
Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Updates to Country
Policies, and Other Changes, 76 Fed. Reg. 152 (August 8, 2011) (to be codified at 22
CFR part 126). Other embargoed countries include: Libya, Lebanon, Somalia, Belarus,
Sudan, North Korea, Iraq, Yemen, Myanmar (formerly Burma), Liberia, Zimbabwe,
Balkans, the Cote D’Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast).
13
Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (2006); see also Export
Controlled or Embargoed Countries, Entities and Persons, STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
DORESEARCH,
https://doresearch.stanford.edu/research-scholarship/export-controls
/export-controlled-or-embargoed-countries-entities-and-persons (last visited Oct. 6,
2014).
14
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 3.
3
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identifier tells the exporter from which shipment destinations the item is
prohibited and whether such shipments require a validated license.15
It is imperative that each export company understands the regulations
in place. A better understanding of each regulation affecting one’s
business directly translates to a more efficient and competitive business.
Large companies seemingly already dominate the export market for
electronics and other technology products, which places smaller trade
businesses at a disadvantage. Further, export controls add an additional
layer of separation in the competition for market share as larger
businesses, which designate teams of experts to work on compliance
issues, are inherently better equipped to handle these export controls.16
In order for small businesses to have a fighting chance in this already
barren market, understanding the existing regulations is key. Small
businesses must prepare for and adapt their policies and procedures to
any new regulations. Such compliance is perhaps their best chance at
competing in the market as a better and quicker understanding of these
regulations allows for more streamlined exports. This is not to say,
however, that the regulations are easily understood and adaptable.
There are a vast amount of regulations on businesses of all sizes that
are expensive and unnecessarily burdensome. This Comment strives to
highlight the issues with regards to the United States’ export control
regime, eliminate the cons already in place, and make suggestions for
future alterations to the regulatory regime.

III.

INTRODUCTION TO EXPORT CONTROLS (U.S.)

The production of hazardous materials for both civilian and military
purposes has led the United States government to establish its own list of
controls–for example the Department of Commerce’s Implementation of
the Wassenaar plenary agreements 17–in order to curb the proliferation of
potentially risky materials falling into the wrong hands, 18 a relatively
new concern in this age of international terrorism. Following the
devastating attacks of September 11, 2011 on domestic soil, the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security significantly
15

Id.
COAL. FOR SEC. & COMPETITIVENESS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A 21ST CENTURY
TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (2010).
17
Department of Commerce, Wassenaar Arrangement 2013 Plenary Agreements
Implementation: Commerce List, Definitions, and Reports; and Extension of Fly-by-Wire
Technology and Software Controls, 79 Fed. Reg. 149 (August 4, 2014) (to be codified at
15 C.F.R. 734).
18
Regulations, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, http://www.bis.
doc.gov/index.php/regulations (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
16
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revamped its export control regime. The sections that were subsequently
revamped apply to export licensing, control lists, brokering regimes, and
sanctions. 19
Currently, the United States government has three primary licensing
departments with subsidiary agencies that work with companies
exporting potentially sensitive armaments and dual-use items and
technology outside of the U.S. borders: the Departments of Commerce,
State, and Treasury. 20 The involvement of so many government entities
can prove overwhelming and confusing for small businesses trying to
export their goods. As a result, the U.S. government is pursuing
alternative means to achieve a more streamlined and liberalized process
of licensing, pushing for a Single Licensing Agency, which would act as
a “one-stop shop” for businesses pursuing export licenses. 21 Further, the
U.S. government strives to achieve these goals through: enforcement,
coordination, and end-use agreements. 22

A.

Regulations

The problematic issue for small business lies in the vast amount of
U.S. export control legislation and governing authorities. 23 The main law
governing export controls is the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 24
which set forth the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that
have been implemented by the Department of State25 The AECA deals
primarily with defense-related goods. Thus, any business desiring the

19

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-234, DEFENSE TRADE: ARMS EXPORT
CONTROL SYSTEM IN THE POST-9/11 ENVIRONMENT (2005) (Report to the Chairman,
Committee on International relations, House of Representatives) [hereinafter U.S. GAO].
20
Overview of U.S. Export Control System, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov
/strategictrade/overview/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Export Control].
21
Id.
22
The U.S. government bases its export control regime on four outlying principles.
First, the U.S. government has a broad national commitment to the regime. The U.S.
follows each multilateral export control regime to the letter by incorporating each and
every controlled item on those lists into the US list, and even adds more of its own
regulations for added security. Second, the U.S. establishes authority to control dual-use
goods through: comprehensive controls, enforcement, directives, and interagency
coordination. Third, it establishes clear modes of authority and a control list. Fourth, the
U.S. government focuses on preventative enforcement such as: end-use agreements,
screening, and educating the market. See Overview of U.S. Export Control System, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2014)
[hereinafter U.S. Export Control].
23
See infra Section IV.
24
Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2780(d) (2013).
25
Id.
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manufacture and exportation of goods used for defense purposes will
have to meet the Act’s strict licensing criteria.26
Many small businesses are also affected by the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (“EAA”), 27 which established the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) coordinated by the Department of
Commerce. 28 This Act controls software and other technology related
dual-use items. The Treasury, mentioned briefly here for completeness
but not in the scope of this Comment, deals mainly with sanctions
relating to embargoed countries and fines for violations of export
controls. 29

B.

Control Lists

The U.S. government implements all of the multilateral export
control regime regulations,30 in addition to various unilateral measures
for state security in the form of three main control lists. First, the
Commerce Control List (CCL) 31 includes each item on the Wassenaar
Arrangement Dual-Use List, 32 all items on the other three control lists,
and then also various additional items that the United States deems as
security risks. 33 The CCL is organized numerically, with each number, 09, corresponding to a different area of product control. 34 The larger the
number, the more controlled the substance35
The other two control lists are the U.S. Munitions List 36 and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Controls.37 Because these lists affect a
smaller portion of the businesses discussed previously, this Comment
will mainly focus on the previous lists, primarily the CCL.

26

Id.
Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 50 U.S.C. App. 2403(e).
28
Id.
29
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 1, at 2-3.
30
Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Updates to Country
Policies, and Other Changes, 76 Fed. Reg. 152 (August 8, 2011) (to be codified at 22
CFR part 126).
31
Commerce Control List, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl (last visited
Oct. 1, 2014).
32
See infra Section IV.
33
Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.
wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
34
Id.; see infra Figure I.
35
Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction, supra note 33.
36
United States Munitions List, 22 CFR Ch. 1 (4-1-13 Edition).
37
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR 37; Security Orders and Requirements,
U.S. NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/security/byproduct/orders.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
27
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Licensing

Companies desiring to export any item on the aforementioned lists
must submit a license request with the qualifying agency. These license
requests may ultimately be reviewed by five different agencies.38 The
process to determine whether to approve a license includes a review of
the applicant, all parties to the transaction, and quantity and quality of
export, including end-use agreements, national security concerns, and
international concerns. 39 These government entities receive a vast
amount of licensing requests, with the Office of Defense Trade Controls
and the Department of Commerce receiving some 55,000 and 12,000,
respectively, per year. 40

IV.

INTRODUCTION TO MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL
REGIME

Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR) are international
bodies that govern the export and licensing of potentially high risk and
hazardous materials. 41 While there are various types export control
regimes, such as those for hazardous waste, there are four particular
international regimes, governing the export of controlled materials,
equipment, and technology for defense-related purposes, which are
applicable herein: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the
Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. 42
a.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a
multinational body consisting of 49 member states that
controls the export of nuclear related technology. 43
b.
The Australia Group (AG) is an informal
collection of 42 member states that controls the export of
chemical and biological technology that has the potential
to be weaponized. 44
38

U.S. Export Control, supra note 20.
Id.
40
Id.
41
See Multilateral Export Control Regimes, BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE,
http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/multilateral-exportcontrol-regimes (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
42
See id.
43
Organisation, NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en
/organisation-information (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
44
THE AUSTRALIA GROUP, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2014).
39

232

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:225

c.
The Missile Technology Control Regime is
likewise an informal collection of states that seeks to
control rockets and other aerial vehicles capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction. 45
d.
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is a
MECR consisting of 41 participating states designed to
control the exportation of various dual-use goods and
technologies. 46 This MECR will be the focus of this
article, detailing the actual controlled items, and the
effect on businesses with regards to exporting the
respective item. (The WA is the crux of this Comment’s
purpose).

V.

WASSENAAR AND DUAL-USE GOODS

The ultimate goal of the WA is “to contribute to regional
and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and
greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dualuse goods and
technologies,
thus
preventing
destabilizing
accumulations.” 47 The WA’s primary purpose is to establish a control list
for recommendation to all countries around the world. 48

A.

Control List

The WA list of restricted items is broken into two categories: DualUse Goods and Technologies (Basic List), and the Munitions List.49 This
Comment does not concern the latter, focusing instead on the list of
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Basic List, which is nearly
identical to the control list espoused by the U.S. government, 50 comprises
of ten categories of goods, organized in increasing levels of
sophistication.

45

The Missile Technology Control Regimes at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, http://
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr (last updated Dec. 2012).
46
Wassenaar Arrangement Introduction, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.
wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Control Lists – Current, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.wassenaar.org
/controllists/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Wassenaar Arrangement
Control Lists].
50
See infra Figure 1.

2014]

EXPORT CONTROL PROLIFERATION

233

Figure I: Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 51
Category 0
Category 1
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4
Category 5
Category 6
Category 7
Category 8
Category 9

VI.

Special Materials and Related Equipment
Materials Processing
Electronics
Computers
Part 1 – Telecommunications
Part 2 – “Information Security”
Sensors and “Lasers”
Navigation and Avionics
Marine
Aerospace and Propulsion

INTERACTION OF DUAL-USE GOODS AND SMALL BUSINESS

The main issue that most small businesses face is one of
understanding exactly which shipped items are covered by federal
regulation. Small businesses in this field frequently lack the expertise
necessary to thrive due to the pervasiveness of burdensome regulations
and 52 control lists. 53 Due to governmental administrative inefficiencies,
this Comment believes it logically follows that many companies have
difficulties ascertaining which federal agency is regulating a certain
product. 54 As a result of the vast overlap in dual-use and defense-related
goods, many items may be subject to either ITAR or EAR, 55 depending
on the item’s classification. 56 Examples of issues that have been subject
to overlapping control include: public domain, defense services,
fundamental research and technical data definitions.57

A.

Navigation Issues

As these lists are not streamlined, navigating them requires extreme
specificity and knowledge of each individual product, down to its
51

Id.
NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, 2013 SMALL BUSINESS EXPORTING
SURVEY 3 (2013).
53
See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2012) (stating that EAR is applicable to “dual-use”
items); 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2011) (showing that ITAR is applicable to defense services
and articles).
54
Consent Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov
/compliance/consent_agreements.html (last updated June 18, 2014).
55
Items may include technical data, diagrams, models, and engineering designs.
56
15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
57
DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, NOV. 2012 PRIORITIES LIST, available
at http://pmddtc.state.gov/dtag/documents/plenary_Nov2012_Priorities.pdf.
52
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component makeup. 58 Many companies need to submit queries into
exactly what components are regulated by which departments, and often
are subjected to a significant time waiting period simply receive an
answer—not to mention the wait period for being approved for the
particular license. 59 With various agencies taking on the decision-making
role and, sometimes representing competing interests, the tribulations for
small businesses are quite clear. 60
These issues are further underscored when looking at the myriad of
departments that regulate goods: Departments of Defense, State,
Commerce, Homeland Security, the Treasury, Energy, and Justice.
Coordination among these departments is lackluster to say the least.61

B.

Multi-Agency Interaction Delays

The setbacks for small businesses are even more evident when
comparing the interactions between the two main regulatory agencies,
the Department of State, for weapons-related material 62, and the
Department of Commerce, for dual-use items. 63 In most instances, the
Commerce list is much less restrictive than the list produced by State. 64
Thus, determining which items are controlled by each list is a
fundamental concern for companies in the business of exporting.
However, the departments have disagreed in the past, sometimes
claiming jurisdiction of identical items. 65
This Comment posits that a competing business can seemingly
choose which system to apply to–the State list or the Commerce list—
based on which is the less restrictive list.66 Herein lies the problem. 67
Small businesses with less experienced export track records will
invariably be disadvantaged to the larger businesses that can exploit
these systemic flaws—thus creating an uneven playing field for the small
business producers.

58

Id.
U.S. GAO, supra note 19, at 2.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 31.
62
Id. at 32.
63
Id. at 36.
64
Id. at 37.
65
Export Control List Review and Creating A Single Control List, EXPORT.GOV, http://
export.gov/ecr/eg_main_027617.asp, (Last visited on Oct. 6, 2014).
66
Businesses can, in essence, chose the department that reviews their lists by
submitting a request to the department or agency it wishes to use—this only applies when
there is overlap in agency or department licensing.
67
Id.
59
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Licensing is another issue borne of these multi-agency and interagency deficiencies. 68 Licenses, prior to 2003, were usually granted
within 13 days. As of 2006, the licensing time had doubled; pushing a
26-day turn-around. 69 These extra two weeks could easily cost businesses
valuable opportunities as competitive businesses position their goods to
be rapidly shipped across the global daily. Continuing in this vein, the
turnaround time listed above does not even take into account backlogs in
each department’s review process. 70 In Fiscal Year 2006, the backlog of
State Department license applications reached a peak of 10,000 cases.71

C.

New Changes as of October 15th, 2013

On October 15th, 2013, the U.S. government began implementing
new regulations and reforms on the export control arena that even further
undermined business productivity. 72 The U.S. government has begun to
incorporate the new 600-series export control classification lists,73,which
are designed to distinguish those items that are “critical to maintaining a
military or intelligence advantage to the United States” (i.e., military
items) and those that necessitate a more flexible control program. 74 The
68

Id.
U.S. GAO, supra note 19, at 2.
70
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-767T, EXPORT CONTROLS:
FUNDAMENTAL REEXAMINATION OF SYSTEM IS NEEDED TO HELP PROTECT CRITICAL
TECHNOLOGIES: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
STATEMENT OF ANNE-MARIE LASOWSKI, DIRECTOR ACQUISITION AND SOURCING
MANAGEMENT 2-3 (2009); see also Nadine Tushe, Export Controls: Do They Undermine
the Competitiveness of U.S. Companies in the Transatlantic Defense Market, 41 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 57, 62 (2011).
71
Id.
72
CCL Based Controls, National Security 15 C.F.R. §742.4(b)(ii)(2014); see also
Export Control Reform—New Order of Review and the “600 Series,” BIS.GOV, available
at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/789-600-series-and-cclorder-of-review; Nicholas A. Rosenberg, The 600 Series: As part of Export Control
Reform, the U.S. government shifts former Munitions List items to a new category on the
Commerce Control List, Nixon Peabody, http://www.nixonpeabody.com/US_
government_shifts_former_Munitions_List_items.
73
Id.
74
Eric L. Hirschorn, Remarks of Under Secretary Eric L. Hirschorn at the Export
Control Reform Workshop, Colorado Springs, CO, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce (May 19, 2014); see also Lindsay A. Meyer et al., United States:
October 15th Export Control Reform Changes Are Around the Corner: Take Time Now
To Understand The Impact On Your Existing Licenses & Authorizations, Mondaq (Dec.
5,
2013),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/262702/Export+controls+Trade+
Investment+Sanctions/October+15th+Export+Control+Reform+Changes+Are+Around+
the+Corner+Take+Time+Now+To+Understand+The+Impact+On+Your+Existing+
Licenses+Authorizations.
69
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program claims its main goal is to facilitate and encourage exports to
U.S. allies. 75 This Comment views these regulations as a double-edged
sword, trying to help, but possibly hindering, the smaller and less-savvy
exporters.
The new 600-series has altered the makeup of the existing control
lists by transferring many items covered by ITAR and the Defense
Department to the CLL, under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Commerce. 76 As aforementioned, the Commerce list is less restrictive.
Thus, these recent regulations can aid businesses that export the
transferred goods.
The main issue for small-businesses, however, is implementation and
industry understanding of the necessary license. 77 With these new
regulations taking effect only months ago, businesses will still be
applying for licenses under ITAR. The Defense Department must then
return this request, forcing resubmission through Commerce—wasting
time and valuable expenses on the company’s part.78 One saving grace of
these regulations, however, allows for the existing license, within two
years of the series’ implementation, to be carried out until its expiration
for the requisite department. 79

1. Subparagraph Provisions
The new regulations do not stop with the item transfers. One of the
most important features of the new 600-series is the subparagraph
provision, designed to alter the replaced regulations,80 which basically
brought certain items under the control of ITAR. 81 Presently, the new
rules designate a “catch and release” provision which, according to the
series’ creators, was adopted because the agencies found that it would be
easier to explain what the term did not or should not encompass as
opposed to what it actually includes. 82 Businesses must thus examine and
possibly reclassify certain exports to match this definition. 83

75

Hirschorn, supra note 74.
CCL Based Controls, supra note 72; see e.g., Airworthiness Directives; Airbus
Airplanes, 78 Fed. Reg. 22431, 22432 (April 16, 2013) (to be codified at 14 CFR Part
39).
77
Meyer, supra note 74.
78
Export Control Reform, supra note 72.
79
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, EXPORT CONTROL
REFORM—NEW ORDER OF REVIEW AND THE “600 SERIES,” http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.
php/forms-documents/doc_view/789-600-series-and-ccl-order-of-review.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.; Meyer, supra note 74.
83
Id.
76
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The new program creates a catch and release program, with
subparagraph “A” catching multiple goods, but subparagraph “B”
releasing these goods. 84 Understanding these new provisions and
classifying goods accordingly is a very important task for exporters. The
problem with the catch and release program for small businesses lies in
the ability to understand these new rules and designate the goods
accordingly. This is a major step in becoming competitively viable in the
larger export market. As of now, while the smaller businesses try to
incorporate and understand the new provisions, larger, more
sophisticated businesses may leave the smaller ones in the dust.

2. Benefits
This is not to say, however, that the new regulations are completely
detrimental to small business owners. There are many benefits to such
individuals of the new regulations, which should inform the existing
regulations on export controls. If the present regulations could
incorporate the positive features of these new 600-series regulations, the
result would be a more streamlined and user-friendly approach for small
businesses.
First, the migration feature permits goods that were previously
controlled by ITAR and now controlled by CCL, to operate under a
single license requirement 85 by amending the existing rules to eliminate
the need for multiple licenses. 86
Second, the new provisions also aid companies desiring to
concurrently ship multiple items that are controlled by different
departments. 87 The company must simply apply for licenses for all of the
goods to the requisite agency. 88 For example, if a company needs to ship
items controlled by both ITAR and CCL, they may ship both goods
together under one license.

VII.

OVERLAP ANALYSIS (DUAL-USE AND SMALL BUSINESS)

The interaction between dual-use regulations and business
competitiveness seem to have become increasingly interwoven in recent
84
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decades. Businesses are frequently at the mercy of the licensing
departments when waiting for licenses to be processed. 89 Many domestic
businesses lament that these regulations hinder their competitive
advantages in the global market. 90 For example, K & F Electronics, a
small circuit board producer based out of Detroit, had professed a serious
loss of profits due to confusion in the licensing market. 91 It has seen
multiple requests for identical items rejected at times and at other times
granted. 92 The uneven application of controls is clearly hurting small
businesses like K & F, which also expressed difficultly in identifying
which parts of its circuits require which licenses—Commerce or State.93
Further, because of the fact that circuit boards may actually be regulated
by the State Department, K & F must obtain explicit authorization to
export products falling under ITAR. 94 Considering identical items have
been stamped ITAR and non-ITAR upon license request, the problems
confounding small businesses alike are evident.95

A.

U.S. Market Share Issues

Many foreign companies actually avoid U.S. companies when
searching for products due to the increasingly strict export regulations. 96
One such domestic company described issues with French and British
customers, stating that those customers “will always buy a non-U.S.
sourced part even for substantially more money to avoid [the] EAR and
especially ITAR.” 97 Some multinational companies, most notably Thales
Alenia Space, 98 have also adopted this buying philosophy by adopting an
“ITAR-Free” unofficial trade practice. 99
89
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Further, in a 2006 accompanying report to a UK survey to evaluate
British-based companies’ attitudes towards controlled American
electronics and technologies, British companies were found to be
increasingly adopting “an unofficial and unstated ‘Buy American Last’
policy due to unsatisfactory experiences with U.S. export control
bureaucracy.” 100
American-based companies are clearly suffering a competitive
disadvantage as a result of these issues. Larger American businesses are
able to traverse these issues by purchasing products on a larger scale, 101
which can be more appealing to foreign customers as only one license
must be procured for the same product, thusly offsetting the underlying
export control disadvantages. 102. Further, these larger companies’
expertise in the field also aids in their global dominance and sales. 103
Smaller companies, however, are unable to compete with their larger
counterparts’ ability to lower prices by mass production. In the end,
however, the export and technology industry will suffer as such lowertier companies are often the “source of much innovation [and are]
normally the most engaged in the global market place in the
aerospace/defense sector.” 104

B.

Competitive Market Loss

The problem highlighted above is compounded by the fact that these
countries can find the goods elsewhere with little export control
hassle. 105 Even if U.S. exporters have the ability and requisite licenses to
ship items abroad, the time and hassle of waiting for an export license
may drive many buyers to seek alternative sources, with much fewer
limitations on the exact items. 106
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This idea is illustrated by a recent market loss example in which a
U.S. company lost business and market share as a result to unnecessary
export controls. 107 The shipment of krypton electric switches (used by
doctors to breakup kidney stones, but also listed as dual-use on the CCL
because the part can be used as a component of a nuclear launcher) is
prohibited for sale in varying countries in the Middle East, including
Iraq. 108 Siemens Corporation, a German company, filled in the gaps and
provided these goods to various Iraqi hospitals. 109
This Comment proposes that it may seem troublesome to many
Americans to sell anything to Iraq, let alone items capable of aiding in
the development of a nuclear launcher considering the instability of the
region. But, taking a step back, it becomes clear that these regulations do
not harm the targeted countries but rather the U.S. companies who might
otherwise export goods to sanctioned nations. Germany, a leading power
in the international economic market, seemingly does think the dangers
outweigh the benefits with regards to shipping such goods to Iraq; France
has equally engaged in this balancing test and deemed it appropriate to
shipping like goods to Iraq. 110 In fact, following the U.S.’s successful
toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, American forces found a
multitude of goods, restricted for sale on the U.S. control list, in Iraq that
were supplied by German and French companies in compliance with
European export control laws. 111
These hospitals had valid licenses and end-user agreements 112;
however, because of over-inclusive U.S. export controls that precluded
American firms from conducting business with these hospitals, U.S.
companies lost business opportunities and, more importantly, global
market share. It may seem that with an increased proliferation of such
materials, the likelihood of said materials falling into the wrong hands
increases. However, what stops German or French companies from
simply sending more of these items? What stops German companies
from producing a few extra switches a year that might otherwise be
supplied by American companies, if the U.S.’s stringent export controls
were to be loosened? The threat of proliferation already exists as a result
of the actions taken by other companies. Hence, concerning items that
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are less than sinister, these unwieldy regulations on domestic firms
necessitate change.
The Secretary of State is permitted to make a discretionary decision
to approve all licenses for good that meet licensing requirements 113
where he or she can determine that an export control is ineffective due to
the availability of the same item in non-U.S. markets. 114 Additionally, the
Secretary may remove the items from the CLL if he or she deems it to be
the appropriate action.115
It seems, at least intuitively, to be a perfect and foolproof system. If
the United States sees other goods being exported by foreign companies
in compliance with the host country’s requisite export laws, then the U.S.
should not fear exporting those items as, theoretically, such controlled
items are already available in the world market. It logically follows that
these items––controlled, of course, by the WAWA–are relatively safe for
exportation, 116,and may be consequentially removed from the export
control list. Therefore, any item that remains on the U.S. control list is
deemed hazardous and not exported by any other countries. 117 This
premise, in theory, seems ideal. The logical question that follows,
however, is what is the point of the U.S. having a CCL or a regulatory
list of its own at all? Why not just use the Wassenaar List in its entirety?
The “ideal” scenario presented above is far from present in the U.S.
control regime. There are numerous specifications on the U.S. control
lists not on the Wassenaar List, and thus not on many of the leading
exporting countries’ lists, either. 118 The U.S. prohibits exports of
controlled items to certain countries altogether, regardless of export
licenses. 119 This demonstrates that the U.S. export controls are vastly
over-inclusive: these regulations encompass any variety of items that are
either not controlled or are nominally controlled by a multitude of
countries, and hampers the sale of those items abroad. In the end, U.S.
small businesses are at the losing end of the over-inclusive regulations—
losing market share and profits in the process.
A simple solution to this problem lies in cooperative information
sharing and licensing procedures. U.S. companies ought to be allowed to
submit requests proving that certain items are uncontrolled by various
other countries around the world. The Secretary of State should then
respond by having the State Department obtain agreement within a short
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
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period from the other countries to control the items they are exporting to
countries of concern, by removing the item from the CCL, or by creating
a special licensing system for these items that is much easier than the
normal export license system.

C.

ITAR Control Effects

In conjunction with the varying degrees of difficulty that the CCL
poses for small businesses desiring to export abroad, ITAR poses an even
stronger limitation, sometimes tying up business for months at a time. 120
Once again, the United States is in the minority when it comes to
munitions and governmental use controls.121
Unlike nearly every other nation, the U.S. imposes a requirement that
it approve re-exports of U.S.-origin items. 122 This re-export regulation
restricts the sale of ITAR-restricted goods, even after they leave the
United States. 123 Most countries implement export protocols that place
the onus on the recipient country to control the item once the item has
been shipped. 124 In this situation, the United States finds itself, once
again, in the minority because ITAR and the U.S. government requires
these controlled goods to be under U.S. jurisdiction for the lifetime of
any good—termed post-shipment verification.125 This requirement
applies to shipments or re-exports of the item from the recipient country
to another and even in-country shipments. 126
Every time the owner of an American-exported good seeks to move
that good across another country’s border, he or she must first seek
permission from the U.S. Department of State. 127 This regulation can be
extremely cumbersome for purchasers who desire to re-export or transfer
the product to another destination, as many companies’ business model
revolves around middle-man type work.
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The problem is self-evident. Even if a foreign company decides to
wait for the lengthy process of U.S. export licensing, it still must comply
with various U.S. controls. Every time it desires to sell this product, it
must apply for a re-transport license from the U.S. government and
inform its future purchaser that it, too, must apply for a license, if he or
she wished to resell the item. 128 Rhetorically, with various simpler
alternatives at their fingertips, why on earth would a consumer buy a
U.S. ITAR-controlled good? Here? Here, small businesses once again
lose valuable market share and business profits abroad as a direct result
of cumbersome U.S. regulations.
Equally problematic for U.S. businesses with ITAR-controlled goods
is the temporal factor. The time it takes 129 to apply for an ITARcontrolled good is vastly more than that of a CCL-controlled good. 130
Similarly, many goods may be simply placed on the ITAR-controlled list
because one of the company’s customers happens to be the U.S.
government. 131 Anytime the U.S. government is a customer of an item,
that particular item must be controlled by ITAR. 132 Companies may
lobby to remove their goods from ITAR, but the process can take
months. 133 Compounded with the inter-agency problems described
above, ITAR classifications pose serious financial problems for small
businesses exporting abroad. 134

D.

Green Technology Challenges

Alarmingly, another industry that may be harmed by the proliferation
of export controls in the United States is that of green technology. 135
Green technology, which has become an emerging and fast growing
industry in recent decades, aids countries in the fight against the harmful
effects of carbon emissions and global climate change. 136
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Of the total U.S. exports ($1,300.5 billion) in 2008, 5.8 percent ($75
billion) were green related technologies, and only 0.9 percent ($697.4
million) of these required an export license. 137 The final calculated
percentage of total exports represented by licensed green technologies
may be nominal (0.05 percent) but this figure constituted 22.5 percent of
total licensed exports. 138 These figures demonstrate how regulated green
technologies actually are—representing a hair more than one-twentieth
of total exports but well over a fifth of total licensed exports.
Many items used for alternative and green technology require export
licenses such as: wind turbines, solar panels, alternative fuel resources
for alternatively fueled vehicles, water purification devices, and energy
efficiency devices.139
What does the above say for small businesses trying to compete in
the green technology market? Many businesses are hindered by the vast
amount of U.S. export controls on these types of technologies. At the
same time, while these businesses are filing for export licenses–
especially for ITAR-controlled products categorized as such because of
existing governmental contracts for those goods or simply inter-agency
administrative hurdles–they are losing out to their foreign counterparts,
who are supplying the same products without the hassle of export or reexport licensing procedures.

E.

Sanctions

There are three main government entities that focus on the
enforcement of U.S. government export controls, including: Directorate
of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), Bureau of Industry and Security
(BIS), and the Department of Treasury. 140 The Department of Homeland
Security via Customs and Border Protection, and the Coast Guard, also
play a large role in the enforcement of export controls by screening
processes regarding containers and other modes cross-border
shipment. 141 Starting in 2007, the U.S. government drastically increased
its civil penalties for export control violations by 500% on corporations
and individuals, from $50,000 to an astounding $250,000. 142
137
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This Comment contends that the most staggering change is that these
penalties may be applied retroactively to incidents that occurred before
2007. 143 Some of the more notable sanctions and penalties include:
$680,000 against Cabela’s Sporting Goods for shipping rifle scopes in
violation of EAR regulations, $4 million against Lockheed Martin for
exporting technical data relating to missile defense, and $3 million
against Boeing for administrative violations.144 It can be argued that for a
company like Lockheed, which realized 2012 net sales of over $47
billion, this penalty is a drop in the bucket.145 However, this again
highlights the main issues affecting small companies while larger
companies, benefitted also by the ability to better understand the
licensing process, are also much better financially positioned to handle
any potential sanctions or penalties. The effects on small businesses
could be drastic considering the monetary compensation that these
companies were required to pay.

F.

The Cold Hard Facts

In a 2013 comprehensive survey by the National Small Business
Association, 146 a large majority of the 500 businesses surveyed can truly
be deemed as small businesses: fifty-two percent of respondents
employed nine employees or fewer and seventy percent reported
spending less than $500,000 on payroll each fiscal year. 147 Further, fortysix percent of the businesses claimed the main barrier to entry to export
goods arises in that they “don’t know much about it and [are] not sure
where to start,” 148 which logically follows from the fact that fifty-four
percent of respondents have been exporting for ten or fewer years.
The most telling numbers, however, were on the import fronts. The
survey clearly showed that the largest impediments to small businesses
are domestic export controls, rather than foreign import controls; fully
sixty-nine percent of companies claimed they had no trouble exporting as
a result of foreign import regulations.149
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Lastly, the survey reports that three-quarters of the responding
businesses reported export control complexity issues, another threequarters reported difficulties with time-consumption regarding
navigating these controls, and fifty-three percent described difficulties as
a result of dealing with multiple agencies. 150

G.

Other Considerations

Some other potentially damaging and unapparent issues include
transfers to foreign employees and suppliers’ classification.151 The
importance of suppliers’ classifications cannot be overstated. Any
American company that receives goods from overseas and subsequently
ships fully constructed items incorporating those goods can be liable
under supplier’s classification failures. In order to ship any product, it
must be classified on the CCL. 152 However, many foreign companies that
supply goods are not familiar with U.S. export controls, and this
unfamiliarity may led to grievous errors, such as failure to receive proper
classifications of the component parts that a company may desire to reexport. 153
A second damaging issue involves foreign employees. If a company
supplies information (controlled material) to a foreign employee who is a
noncitizen or permanent resident of the U.S., that information can be
deemed an export and, thus, in violation of export controls. 154 Each
business should be familiar with this regulation entitled the “Deemed
Export Rule.” 155

H.

Recommendations

Because of the issues that vendors and buyers may have with regards
to classifications, a helpful law could incorporate various export and
import requirements on the side of the foreign supplier. Given vendors’
tendencies to include liability clauses that exclude liability for export
controls, the supplier or vendor should be required to provide export
classifications, thus sharing the burden on all the parties involved. 156 This
would also aid and protect small businesses that are relatively new to the
market and unfamiliar with the vendors’ liability limitation practices.
150
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This requirement would ensure that suppliers would not only share a
portion of the liability, but also a quicker and easier license classification
determination because component suppliers are surely more aware of
various export controls on their products than final product
manufacturers, who have less of a gauge on what specific components of
a total product are regulated.
The second proposed regulation deals with the Deemed Export Rule.
Through continued global trade, businesses have employees all over the
globe. Businesses should not be limited on the information they can
provide employees solely because said employee is a non-U.S. citizen. A
possible way around these potential export control violations is an
employee vetting system. Each company that deals in controlled goods
should be allowed to submit a list of foreign employees to whom it
would like to afford access to various controlled material. Similar to an
export control, the employees could be vetted in a single-streamed
process, thus reducing the need for multiple and overlapping export
controls every time a company wishes to provide controlled material to a
foreign employee.

VIII.

TAKEAWAY

So what is the takeaway after looking at all of the daunting tasks that
small businesses are facing? Is there any way that businesses can survive
in such a regulation-ridden world? The answer is “of course,” and those
businesses will continue to survive, if not thrive. The key to success,
which can make a world of difference, is one of knowing and
understanding the new regulations before they take effect, in addition to
the old ones currently in place.
The critical point that small businesses need to understand is how
each regulation affects their individual business. Trying to understand the
overall export control framework may be a challenge, but if a company
can understand their niche, they stand a better chance at compliance.
That is not to say, however, that the onus is solely on the part of the
small businesses. As discussed above, agency overlap is a huge problem
in export control compliance today. Each individual agency should
understand the areas it is designated to control. Any overlaps should be
defaulted to the Department of Commerce, considering its relatively
superior temporal ability in license turnaround with respect to other
executive departments. Although this may raise security concerns, goods
on which multiple government entities overlap will likely be items the
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Department of Defense 157 has no need to control in the first place—as
any weapons material and ITAR-controlled items will automatically go
to the Defense Department.
The U.S. government should also incorporate more regulations like
those implemented on October 15, 2013—using a catch and release
subparagraph scheme that businesses can easily understand. Regulation
navigation is also a key concern that should be addressed by future
legislation. Supplementing the plethora of regulations focused on minor
specifications with common goods that use each component could make
a huge difference. Further, requiring foreign exporting companies
(companies importing components into the United States) to provide
licensing information to U.S. re-export companies can further reduce the
burden on small business manufacturers that might otherwise be unaware
of the particular export restrictions.
The U.S. government also needs to do modify its re-export license
requirement for ITAR-controlled goods. This requirement not only
creates delays in shipping, but also seriously injures businesses selling
items abroad, as the purchaser in many instances is most likely not the
end-consumer. The federal government might also reach agreements
with various trusted countries and allow these countries to control the reexportation of certain goods originating from the United States. This
would allow the U.S. to continue regulating goods to potentially
dangerous, high-risk countries, without requiring every single item to
need a re-export license. These agreements with trusted countries would
also ensure that the original licensing requirements are not affected.
If each group, small businesses, importers, agencies, and the U.S.
government, were to work in tandem and make a concentrated effort to
do their individual parts, the U.S. and small domestic businesses will
undoubtedly win back their market share on the world-exportation front.

157

This Comment proposes that the Department of Defense should not be involved in
the regulation of certain goods that can be regulated by the Commerce Department
because the latter, as evidenced by this comment, usually regulates non-military items,
thus not under the munitions list’s jurisdiction.

